The nonprofit sector has experienced exponential growth over the past three decades with nearly 50,000 new nonprofits created last year. Past examples of industry growth suggest that this rate of growth is not sustainable. Empirical population ecology studies of nascent industries show a period of rapid growth followed by market saturation, then consolidation of organizations and market share resulting in increased competition for small and new organizations. We use historical nonprofit data from the NCCS and apply ecological models to show that the nonprofit sector may be fast approaching growth limits. Market saturation varies by metropolitan area and nonprofit subsector.
INTRODUCTION
The nonprofit sector has sustained tremendous expansion over the past half a century with growth rates exceeding both business and government sectors (Roeger, Blackwood et al. 2012 ). This expansion has been important as nonprofits have been a major source of economic and employment growth (Salamon, Sokolowski et al. 2012) . We argue here that these high growth rates in the nonprofit sector will soon cease. Using data over a twenty-year time frame we show that market exit rates are converging with entry rates, which will result in slow and sometimes negative industry growth. The nonprofit sector is approaching a period of saturated markets where resources are spread thin and new organizations struggle for survival.
Many notable studies of nonprofit markets have focused on entry rates of new nonprofits (Corbin 1999 , Saxton and Benson 2005 , Seokki 2010 , Stretesky, Huss et al. 2011 , Harrison and Thornton 2012 , Lecy and Van Slyke 2013 , factors that predict organizational vulnerability and demise (Galaskiewicz and Bielefeld 1998 , Hager 2001 , Hager, Galaskiewicz et al. 2004 , Duckies, Hager et al. 2005 , Dougherty, Maier et al. 2008 , Fernandez 2008 , Carroll and Stater 2009 , Pandey, Sjoquist et al. 2009 , Wollebaek 2009 , Maier 2010 , Vance 2010 , Walker and McCarthy 2010 , Burger and Owens 2013 , and overall growth of the sector (Grønbjerg and Paarlberg 2001 , Matsunaga and Yamauchi 2004 , Harrison and Laincz 2008 , Luksetich 2008 , Armsworth, Fishburn et al. 2012 ).
These studies have by and large treated entry, exit and growth as stable or equilibrium processes, not dynamic market processes. Research on the aging process of industries shows us that these rates should naturally change over time, often in predictable ways (Carroll and Hannan 1995) . We are the first to track the convergence of the entry and exit rates in the nonprofit sector to examine growth as a dynamic process over time that will be significantly slowed by markets saturation. We will draw upon several literatures on aging industries and market dynamics to consider potential scenarios that might emerge as a result of nonprofit market saturation. By market saturation we mean specifically that a market cannot support more nonprofits, i.e. that entry rates equal exit rates. Market saturation does not imply that demand for nonprofit services has been met.
The analysis is approached from a supply-side perspective since carrying capacity is tied more to funding sources for nonprofits than it is to demand for services (Lecy and Van Slyke 2013; Mirae Kim; Pevcin 2012) . There is also an important distinction between market capacity (the number of nonprofits that a market can support), and sector capacity (the total services provided, often proxied by the total spending on programs). It is feasible for a market to reach capacity but sector capacity to continue expansion because of growth of existing nonprofits.
We contribute to the understanding of nonprofit market forces by demonstrating a clear trend towards market saturation across all major metropolitan areas. There is, however, heterogeneity in convergence rates across metro areas. Some cities have already entered periods of slow or negative growth; others are still expanding fairly rapidly. We devote the second part of the paper to exploring factors associated with stable or declining sector growth rates across metropolitan areas.
In the last part of the paper we consider the implications of this increased competition on nonprofits. We track the overall decrease in HHI measures over time, which suggests that nonprofit markets are becoming more competitive at the same time they become more saturated. This is good in the sense that we do not see evidence that might suggest monopolistic behavior. It does, however, raise questions about the changing nature of competition in the sector. We examine the relationship between nonprofit size and exit rates to demonstrate that large nonprofits experience less failure than small, new nonprofits.
OVERVIEW OF GROWTH OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR
The nonprofit sector is sizable: there are currently an estimated 2.3 million nonprofits operating in the US and 1.3 million registered with the IRS. There are approximately 64,000 nonprofits with revenues above $10 million each year, and sector revenues accounted for $1.51 trillion dollars in economic activity in 2012. Collectively nonprofits control $2.71 trillion in assets (Roeger, Blackwood et al. 2012 ).
Mass mobilization during war periods have always had a stimulating effect on civil society (Skocpol 2013) , and World War II was no different. Almost two decades later the major civil society transition from membership organizations and social clubs to professionalized and advocacy-focused organizations began with significant social movements in the 1960's including women's rights, civil rights, and later on the environmental movement (Skocpol 2013) . The birth of the modern safety net following WWII and the War on Poverty created demand for new social service organizations. The inter-dependence between nonprofits and government programs deepened in the 1980's with the hollowing out of the state which shifted government capacity from direct service provision towards contracts with private service-providers, many of which were nonprofits. All of these trends had significant impacts on the growth and expansion of the nonprofit sector so that by 2010 there were over 50,000 new nonprofit 501(c)(3) statuses being granted by the IRS each year. The expansion of the nonprofit sector over the past fifty years has varied by subsector.
Environmental nonprofits are fairly new to the game, for example, so that subsector has been expanding faster than other subsectors over the past two decades (Straughan 2008) . Although rates vary a great deal, growth over all subsectors in the past twenty years has been significant. It is for this reason that nonprofits have added employment at a faster rate that the government or private sectors, even during periods of economic downturn (Salamon, Sokolowski et al. 2012 ). Based upon this impressive performance and the apparent upward trajectory of sector size it is easy to see why scholars have been optimistic about persistent nonprofit growth. Total sector size can be deceiving, though, since by the peak of any industry the process of decline is already underway.
Organizational ecology shows us that past growth is not a good predictor of future growth of markets, and the dynamics of entry, exit, and market concentration are paramount to understanding expansion or contraction of an industry. Some literature on market dynamics in aging industries is discussed next.
THEORIES OF MARKET CONCENTRATION AND INDUSTRY SHAKEOUT
Our analysis of industry dynamics builds upon the ecological models of organizations developed by Hannan, Freeman, Carroll, and collaborators (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976 , Hannan and Freeman 1977 , Carroll 1984 , Hannan and Freeman 1993 , Carroll and Hannan 1995 . In this work they ask the question, what do industries look like as they are created, mature, and age and how do these industry environments affect the organizations operating within them? Organizational ecology was developed partly to challenge the dominant orthodoxy at the time that management practices were largely responsible for the behavior and performance of firms. The ecological literature shows that environments (i.e. markets) can have a large influence on performance of individual firms, and also that industries evolve over time in large part through selection processes on populations of organizations, which includes the introduction of innovation through new firms and the closure of old firms, versus change occurring merely through adaptation of existing organizations. These ecological models are complimentary to life-cycle studies of industry in economics and theories of creative destruction and entrepreneurism (Schumpeter 1942 , Nelson 1982 , Agarwal and Gort 1996 , but they tend to emphasize different mechanisms such as the legitimization process (organizational ecology) versus technological transformation of production processes and cost structures or the emergence of economies of scale (industrial economics), or a focus on entrepreneurial processes and market control (business strategy).
Unlike equilibrium models of markets the emphasis of ecological models is the evolution of industries over time. New industries are created through the emergence of new technologies and demands in society. Nascent industries always face challenges in early phases as consumers are unfamiliar with the product and the organizational form has yet to be legitimized. If the new industry provides enough value to the customers and production is profitable then the industry begins to expand. New markets can be extremely profitable, especially for equity investors as firms grow, so early entrants can experience large returns. This fuels the interest of potential competitors, entry rates rise, and the total size of the industry, measured by the number of firms, grows rapidly. As new firms flood the market, though, the competition for existing and future customers becomes fierce. Firms that are not able to establish a stable market niche or demonstrate adequate returns on capital over time are forced to exit. A tipping point is reached when firm exits exceed entrants, thus causing a decline in the number of firms in the market (Carroll and Hannan 1995, Agarwal and Gort 1996) .
The decline in the number of firms should not be confused with industry collapse; the overall industry capacity may still expand past the tipping point through growth of surviving firms and industry concentration. For example, the number of computer manufacturing firms declined rapidly following industry shakeout, but the overall production of computers continued to rise as several firms expanded production and increased their market share (McClellan 1984) . Similar processes are observed in the railroad industry (firms consolidated while total miles of track expanded), labor unions (membership rising despite fall in unions), and automobile manufacturing after industry consolidation (Carroll and Hannan 1995) .
The process described above has been called an industry shakeout (Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994, Klepper 1997) , a process by which the total number of firms declines rapidly at a specific point in time. In most instances it is related primarily to population dynamics and the industry lifecycle, but in specific instances it can be induced by an external shock as was the case of the banking industry shakeout during the Great Depression (Walter 2005) . These processes will vary by industry as a result in differences in market size, production technologies (especially whether economies of scale can be achieved), market concentration, and economic costs or barriers to market entry (Bartelsman, Haltiwanger et al. 2004 , Bartelsman, Scarpetta et al. 2005 . Empirical examples of market shakeout include the US tire industry (Carree and Thurik 2000) , digital markets (Day and Fein 2003) , the German laser industry (Buenstorf 2007) , labor unions (Hannan and Freeman 1987) , beer brewing (Horvath, Schivardi et al. 2001 , Tremblay, Iwasaki et al. 2005 , and newspaper industries (Van Kranenburg, Palm et al. 1998 , Van Kranenburg, Palm et al. 2002 to name just a few. The cause of a shakeout process is a function both of declining entry rates as potential firms recognize that the market is crowded or perhaps cannot attract enough investment to enter, and failure rates increase as resources and customers become scarce.
Bonaccorsi (2000) points out that most of the work on industrial dynamics has focused on cases where shakeout has occurred, but industries that grow with a non-shakeout pattern, which are the majority of manufacturing industries, have not received as much scrutiny. There are examples of steady industry expansion with a plateau of industry participants without the subsequent crash including a study of the synthetic dye industry (Murmann and Homburg 2001) and the turboprop engine industry , petrochemicals, disposable diapers, and zippers . In many of these cases, specialization of process engineering and marketing firms eroded the advantages of plant size and R&D capacity of incumbants, thus preventing the high market concentration and subsequent shakeout that occurred in other industries .
As a result of this gap in the literature we do not have as well-formed models of slow growth as we do of industry shakeout, but we can hypothesize what such a market should look like. Instead of a rapid fall in entry rates followed by a rise in exit rates leading to an overall negative growth rate, entry and exit rates could converge to a stable long-term growth rate (one that tracks the expansion of the population or the economy, perhaps). This would result in a stable number of firms when the number of new firms is equal to the number of exiting firms each year, or a steady expansion if the growth rate is positive. In order to maintain sector capacity existing nonprofits would have to expand to fill gaps in services, resulting in higher market concentration. This scenario is possible but not necessarily the likely scenario. A stable population scenario could occur if the downward trend in entry and the upward trend in exit both flatten out, resulting in a flat or slowly expanding population of nonprofits. Both cases would have significant implications for donor policies, service capacity within communities, and innovation.
MARKET CONCENTRATION
The idea of market concentration plays a central role in competition theory. The theory predicts that as a market matures specific firms will gain competitive advantage through more efficient production processes, economies of scale, improved quality, superior marketing, patents and trademarks, or other strategic means. As this occurs they take market share from less competitive firms, leading to high levels of market concentration. Concentration is usually measured by how much of the total market is controlled by a small number of firms, the market often defined as the total dollar amount of goods and services purchased. The HHI Index was developed as a way to quantify market concentration through a simple scale that ranges from zero to one. Various studies lead to useful heuristics on market competitiveness: HHI levels from 0.0 to 0.2 are considered to be competitive, healthy markets. Levels from 0.2 to 0.4 are considered to be markets with high concentration and potential for non-competitive behaviors that can interfere with market efficiency. And levels over 0.4 are interpreted as quasi-monopolistic markets. Lower levels of concentration are favorable, and are assumed to coincide with healthy market characteristics such as low barriers to entry, efficient allocation of capital, implicit safeguards against rent-seeking behavior, and ultimately conditions for the welfare-maximizing behavior of markets. Studies of market concentration predict that higher concentration results in less competitive markets where a few producers yield a high amount of power and generally have competitive advantages over smaller firms. As a result we would expect higher concentrations to coincide with stagnant markets, higher firm exit rates, and slower industry growth (in number of firms).
Theories of the industry life-cycle and market concentration are related in important ways.
Shakeout and market concentration are somewhat synonymous processes. The rapid drop in firms occurs during shakeout because of market concentration -specific firms have control over an industry and their competitive advantage prevents new firms from entering the market, thus lowering entry rates, and also erodes return for existing firms, incentivizing exit. In some cases, dominant firms can also gain market share through buyouts and takeover, another form of firm exit. Stated succinctly, the causes of shakeout and market concentration are the same -market consolidation that occurs because of some firms gaining dominance through competitive advantage.
But industry maturation does not always lead to a market shakeout or increased market concentration. Ecological models of markets offer an alternative explanation of changes in vital rates. Just as a finite tract of land has a specifying carrying capacity for an animal population, an industry embedded within an economy can only grow to a specific finite size before demand is satiated. When a market becomes saturated customer acquisition becomes more challenging and costly, therefore firm sustainability is more challenging and exit rates increase. This process will happen in a perfectly competitive market, and is thus independent of the level of concentration.
Market size relative to total carrying capacity will predict exit rates above and beyond concentration.
COMPETING HYPOTHESES
These two perspectives on competition, saturation versus concentration, lead to different testable hypotheses:
H1: Increased market concentration should lead to less competitive markets, competitiveness measured by lower entry rates and higher exit rates.
H2: Increased market size will result in higher levels of market saturation, thus leading to lower entry rates and higher exit rates.
Market carrying capacity is not always known and is perhaps not even static (changing preference or complimentary goods and services can increase demand). But we assume here that market saturation will increase over time as the current market expands. This will be true as long as carrying capacity (demand for nonprofits) is not expanding at a faster rate than markets size (total supply of services), which is a reasonable assumption in most circumstances. As a result, market age can be used as a proxy for market saturation with the added assumption that markets approach their carrying capacity at more or less the same pace. Since market concentration will also increase over time (empirically this has been the case in all of the shakeout examples that have been mentioned), then market age can also be correlated with concentration. Stating the hypotheses differently then:
H1: Increased market concentration will lead to lower entry and higher exit rates, even when controlling for market age. H2: Older markets will lead to lower entry and higher exit rates, even while controlling for market concentration.
H3: Population growth will increase overall market capacity.
The remainder of this paper will focus on these three hypotheses. The next section introduces the data and models used for the analysis, and we conclude with some implications of the results.
DATA AND METHODS
We are interested in the variation in nonprofit sector growth rates across metro areas. In this section we present a basic, descriptive model that helps us understand the factors related to nonprofit sector vital rates (entry, exit, and growth). We examine three OLS models, one of each vital rate regressed on a set of factors related to nonprofit density. Specific attention will be paid to population growth, sector age within a metro area, and market concentration as these related to the stated hypotheses. support. In the analysis, we aggregated the total revenue and contributions for the MSA as a whole prior to calculating the proportion from public support, so the variable measures the revenue mix for the region, not each nonprofit. We calculated the age of the nonprofit sector in each MSA by combining two data files from the NCCS, the Core Trend file previously and the Business Master Government size has been identified as an important variable in predicting nonprofit density since government services and nonprofit services can often be substitutes (when local governments choose to contract out services they often turn to nonprofits). We account for the size of the government sector in each MSA with four variables from the Census' USA Counties Database.
Government earnings and employment measures the total amount of wages and number of government employees as categorized within the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). The Bureau of Economic Analysis within the Department of Commerce prepares the data for both variables. Additionally, data on the total number of grants and direct payments from the federal government were obtained from the Census Bureau's Census of Governments. Because each of these variables are highly correlated and thus including them together in the model will induce variance inflation on these coefficients we instead create an index of government size using principle component analysis. The variables were centered and components extracted. All of the variables loaded on the first component, which explains 95% of the total variance. A weighted index was created from the separate government employee earnings, direct payments, government grants, and number of government employee variables. This index is interpreted as a single measure of government size or capacity in the metro area. 
RESULTS
We estimate an OLS regression model using 2005 data to examine the relationship between metropolitan characteristics, nonprofit market characteristics, and vital rates. Since it is a crosssectional model the results should be interpreted as primarily descriptive; cities with higher/lower levels of the independent variable tend to have higher/lower vital rates. The model is meant to help identify which variables are salient when looking at nonprofit sector growth.
The full regression models can be found in the appendix. They include all covariates in the model, but the tables here report only primary policy variables (population growth, average age of nonprofits, and market concentration). The majority of the control variables included in the model do not yield statistically significant results. Additional discussion on these variables can be found in the appendix. Several interesting findings emerge from the analysis. First of all, as predicted population growth is positively related to nonprofit sector growth. The cities that have been growing also have more nonprofit entries and higher overall growth as indicated by the positive and significant coefficients.
We assume that this stems from larger sector capacity as a result of larger populations to serve, donor pools, etc. Surprisingly, though, an expanding population is not associated with lower exit rates. Hypothesis 3 is supported with the caveat that increased market capacity will not necessarily impact exit rates, which appear to be more strongly tied to market age and concentration instead of size.
Second, sector age is a much better predictor of vital rates than market concentration. In all of the models we see that average age of nonprofits within a sector (which we interpret as a proxy for the age of the sector itself -when the sector began to develop relative to other metro areas) is statistically significant in each of the model, even when controlling for market concentration in Model 3. Conversely, market concentration is not significant in any of the models. Thus we find strong support for Hypothesis 2, that carrying capacity matters, and weak support for Hypothesis 1, that market concentration has a big impact on vital rates. The results favor an ecological view of markets that describe market size expanding until it reaches capacity, then declining. The negative sign on the coefficients for Age imply that older markets have lower rates of entry and grow at slower rates, which is predicted by ecological literatures (Carroll and Hannan 1995) .
The one caveat to these findings is that the negative coefficient on age in the model using exit rates as the dependent variable suggests that older markets have lower exit rates, which is opposite of what the ecological literature would predict. This result makes more sense when we examine the coefficients in Model 4, which include an interaction term for sector age and market concentration.
In this case we see that concentration now matters, and the interaction is also significant, even though market age is no longer significant. The interpretation of this finding is that market concentration matters only in older markets. Younger markets may not yet be close to saturation, so market concentration may not have as much of a binding effect. In older markets, though, competition may be experienced more as resources are scarcer in crowded markets. In this scenario, market concentration may have a larger effect.
In general we find that growth of a city leads to opportunity for nonprofit sector expansion.
Population growth appears to be more important than the size of the government or philanthropic capital within a city. The age of the market, measured by the average age of nonprofits operating within the market, has a negative effect on entrance and growth rates -new nonprofits are less inclined to enter crowded markets. Exit rates, however, are not directly affected by population expansion (market expansion), nor by the average age of the sector. They appear to be more influenced by the interaction between sector age within a city and market concentration -older markets that are highly concentrated have higher organizational failure rates.
DISCUSSION ON COMPETITION IN THE NONPROFIT SECTOR
We find ourselves in an interesting historical period in the nonprofit sector as the industry has been expanding rapidly over the past few decades, but that expansion appears to be tapering with falling market entry rates and rising exit rates. If these rates converge then the market size will plateau. If entry rates fall below exit rates then there will be industry shake-out characterized by a decline in the number of nonprofits (though capacity can continue to expand) and a rise in market concentration. It is difficult to predict at this time which scenario will occur, but it is possible to examine long-term trends in market concentration. We can see from the graphic below that total market concentration has been falling over time. If the shakeout scenario was more salient we might expect to see market concentration on the rise as firms begin to leave crowded markets and the remaining firms expand to take their place.
Economies of scale and improved organizational efficiencies of veteran organizations are important contributors of this process, but there are some reasons why we might not expect to see these in nonprofit markets. Services to vulnerable populations are often labor-intensive, and thus are difficult to scale. And because nonprofits are often embedded in two-sided markets where service recipients do not always pay for services, rather donors cover costs, there are not always clear incentives to develop new production technologies as they might not help gain market share.
As a result, when markets become saturated then steady but slow or plateaued growth is a feasible scenario. Just based upon linear trend forecasts of the decline in growth rates, market saturation may occur as early as 2020.
The idea of churn is very important for innovation and dynamism to occur in markets. For churn to occur new organizations have to grow to replace older and more established organizations. This is the process of creative destruction so famously described by Schumpeter (1942) , a process that helps innovation to drive economic growth. Churn is not guaranteed within the nonprofit sector, though. When examining the nature of competition within the nonprofit sector it is important to understand how different types of organizations experience competition. If we reach a steady-state where entry rates equal exit rates for a particular sector, for example, which organizations are exiting the market? Is it only small ones, or is it a mix of large and small organizations? If large organizations are unaffected by competition then only the small ones will be affected by market saturation. This has serious implications for the nonprofit sector as it may slow innovation, change, and adaptability. Having a better understanding of the large market forces at work, as well as the cost structures and economic processes that drive entry and exit, will help us better understand the changes in the sector that we can expect over the next decade. 
